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I. Information and the Internet 
There is a tendency to forget how young the Internet is. Modern computing and data traf-
ficking are not even historical pre-teens. The personal computer was not widely available to 
consumers until the late 1970s, and the Internet was not fully commercialized until 1995.1 
Less than two decades later, seventy-six percent of Americans own at least one personal com-
puter and seventy-seven percent regularly rely on the Internet.2 Increasingly, businesses, 
schools, news organizations, and financial institutions offer their services exclusively online.3 
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security reports a high level of integration and reliance, 
noting that “our economy and national security are fully dependent upon . . . the information 
infrastructure,” and that “the core of the information infrastructure upon which we depend is 
the Internet.”4 
Not only are business and infrastructure web-reliant, but social interactions are now on-
line affairs. More people spend more time online due to social networking, which represents 
one of the fastest growing sectors of Internet use.5 “[T]he time spent on these websites is 
growing three times faster than the overall Internet rate, and using social networking web-
sites is currently the fourth most popular online activity.”6 Younger demographics more than 
their senior counterparts eschew traditional forums of social interaction in favor of social 
 
 1. See Brett Frischmann, Privatization and Commercialization of the Internet Infrastructure: Rethink-
ing Market Intervention into Government and Government Intervention into the Market, 2 COLUM. 
SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 25 (2001). 
 2. Internet Usage and Population Growth, INTERNET WORLD STATS, 
http://www.internetworldstats.com/am/us.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2013). 
 3. Jongho Kim, Ubiquitous Money and Walking Banks: Environment, Technology, and Competition in 
Mobile Banking, 8 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 37 (2008) (discussing privacy issues in mobile pay-
ments and mobile banking); Edward Lin, “Virtual” Schools: Real Discrimination, 32 SEATTLE U. L. 
REV. 177 (2008); Maurice E. Stucke & Allen P. Grunes, Toward a Better Competition Policy for the 
Media: The Challenge of Developing Antitrust Policies That Support the Media Sector’s Unique Role 
in Our Democracy, 42 CONN. L. REV. 101, 112 (2009). 
 4. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., THE NATIONAL STRATEGY TO SECURE CYBERSPACE viii (2003), avail-
able at https://www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/publications/cyberspace_strategy.pdf. 
 5. See News Release: Social Networks & Blogs Now 4th Most Popular Online Activity, Ahead of Person-
al Email, Nielson Reports, NIELSEN ONLINE (Mar. 9, 2009), http://www.nielsen-
online.com/pr/pr_090309.pdf [hereinafter Nielsen News Release]. See also Social Networking and 
Blog Sites Capture More Internet Time and Advertising, NIELSEN NEWSWIRE (Sept. 24, 2009), 
http://blog.nielsen.com/nielsenwire/online_mobile/social-networking-and-blog-sites-capture-more-
internet-time-and-advertisinga/; Dawn C. Nunziato, Romeo and Juliet Online and in Trouble: Crim-
inalizing Depictions of Teen Sexuality (c u l8r: g2g 2 jail), 10 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 57, 58 
(2012). 
 6. Joseph Monaghan, Comment, Social Networking Websites’ Liability for User Illegality, 21 SETON 
HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 499, 508 (2011) (citing Nielsen News Release, supra note 5).  
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networking sites, leaving those without Internet access outside the social norm.7 “Increasing-
ly, being connected to society means being connected to the Internet.”8 
Some nations have declared Internet access a fundamental right,9 claiming that their citi-
zens must be able to access the Internet in order to exercise freedom of expression and other 
fundamental human rights, providing that states have a responsibility to ensure that Inter-
net access is broadly available. Such protections are not without merit. The uprising in Egypt 
demonstrated the Internet’s vital role in organizing popular revolution as well as the Inter-
net’s role in attempts to quash it.10 Unfortunately, the Egyptian government’s decision to 
truncate Internet access to forestall revolution has been repeated. Syrian officials recently cut 
Internet access nationwide,11 a move that may evidence desperation since Internet access is 
important to both insurgents and establishment alike.12 If nations, like Egypt and Syria, can 
sever Internet access to frustrate popular uprisings, declaring such access a fundamental 
right provides some assurance. 
Not only is Internet access and reliance relatively new, its scope is enormous and growing. 
Wal-Mart, for example, generates more than one million transactions an hour, which requires 
more than 2560 terabytes. By the end of June 2012, Facebook reported 955 million monthly 
active users and 552 million daily active users.13 Twitter estimated over 500 million users 
and a website that generates “over 400 million tweets a day.”14 Recent YouTube use equates 
to “500 years of YouTube video are watched on Facebook each day.”15  Approximately 247 bil-
lion emails are sent every day.16 And it is only getting bigger. 
 
 7. See Teens on Social Networks, EMARKETER (Apr. 16, 2009), 
http://www.emarketer.com/Article/Teens-on-Social-Networks/1007041 (stating that seventy-five per-
cent of American teens use social networks, and predicting that number to increase to seventy-nine 
percent by 2013). See also Amanda Lenhart, Adults and Social Network Websites, PEW INTERNET 
(Jan. 14, 2009), http://www.pewinternet.org/Reports/2009/Adults-and-Social-Network-Websites.aspx 
(finding that seventy-five percent of adults, ages eighteen to twenty-four, use online social net-
works). 
 8. See Jake Adkins, Note, Unfriended Felons: Reevaluating the Internet’s Role for the Purpose of Spe-
cial Conditions in Sentencing in a Post-Facebook World, 9 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 263, 264 
(2011). 
 9. Nicola Lucchi, Access to Network Services and Protection of Constitutional Rights: Recognizing the 
Essential Role of Internet Access for the Freedom of Expression, 19 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 645 
(2011); Steven C. Bennett, The “Right to be Forgotten”: Reconciling E.U. and U.S. Perspectives, 30 
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 161 (2012). 
 10. See James Glanz & John Markoff, Egypt Leaders Found ‘Off’ Switch for Internet, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 
15, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/16/technology/16internet.html (characterizing the inter-
net blackout as “a dark achievement that many had thought impossible in the age of global connect-
edness”). 
 11. See Sean Ludwig, Internet Shut Down in Syria Amid Mass Protests, VENTUREBEAT (June 3, 2011), 
http://venturebeat.com/2011/06/03/internet-shut-down-in-syria-amid-mass-protests/ (“When a Mid-
dle Eastern country is in the thick of an uprising, it’s almost expected that challenged governments 
will shut down the Internet to hinder protesters from communicating.”). 
 12. See Anupam Chander, Essay, Jasmine Revolutions, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1505, 1520–21, 1524 
(2012). 
13.  See Nicole P. Grant, Mean Girls and Boys: The Intersection of Cyberbullying and Privacy Law and 
its Social-Political Implications, 56 HOW. L.J. 169, 180–82 (2012). 
14. Id. at 181. 
15. Id. at 182 
 16. Andrea Bartz & Brenna Ehrlich, Stop Yourself from Making Egregious E-Mail Errors, CNNTECH 
(July 28, 2010), http://www.cnn.com/2010/TECH/social.media/07/28/netiquette.email.mistakes/.     
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The rate of Internet penetration in developing countries continues to grow. While Internet 
penetration among many African nations, for example, ranks among the lowest, the growth 
rate—the rate of new Internet users in Africa—far eclipses the rest of the globe.17 China add-
ed over twenty-seven million Internet users in 2011.18 At 487 billion gigabytes, the world’s 
digital content reduced to a stack of books would reach to Pluto ten times.19 
This increasing quantity of information coursing through the Internet spawned a burgeon-
ing industry in data aggregation and analytics. Data mining and analytics generally refer to 
the collection and analysis of large datasets to divine patterns and relationships among the 
data that enable enterprises to predict consumer behavior. In 2012, the data collection and 
analytics industry showed revenues of over $5 billion dollars. A recent study predicts that the 
“Big Data market is on the verge of a rapid growth spurt that will see it top the $50 billion 
mark worldwide within the next five years.”20 The field is a large one that is rapidly growing 
larger, because consumer information is an increasingly valuable commercial asset. 
The commercial boom and the benefits inherent in analyzing large amounts of data are 
offset by a number of concerns including erosion of personal privacy. Much has been written 
that memorializes and chronicles privacy abuses in the Internet age.21 A recent empirical 
study at U.C. Berkeley will suffice for the purposes of this Article as an example of privacy 
abuse.22 In 2009 and 2011, researchers gathered data on Internet tracking technologies.23 
Among other findings, they discovered that persistent tracking of personal Internet behavior 
was not only common but also relatively unknown to consumers.24 Over two years, the study 
showed that “the number of tracking cookies expanded dramatically and that advertisers had 
developed new, previously unobserved tracking mechanisms that users cannot avoid even 
 
 17. See Idéle Esterhuizen, Internet Growth Strong in Africa, ENGINEERING NEWS (Jan. 16, 2012), 
http://www.engineeringnews.co.za/article/Internet-growth-strong-in-africa-2012-01-16; Africa Inter-
net Use Hits 2,000 Per Cent Growth, CITIZEN (Jan. 17, 2012), http://thecitizen.co.tz/business/-/18964-
africa-Internet-use-hits-2000-per-cent-growth. 
 18. See Michael Kan, China Reaches 485 Million Internet Users as Growth Slows, PC WORLD (July 19, 
2011), http://www.pcworld.com/businesscenter/article/235978/china_reaches_485_million_ inter-
net_users_as_growth_slows.html. 
 19. Richard Wray, Internet Data Heads for 500bn Gigabytes, GUARDIAN (May 18, 2009), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2009/may/18/digital-content-expansion.  
 20. Jeff Kelly, Big Data Market Size and Vendor Revenues, WIKIBON, 
http://wikibon.org/wiki/v/Big_Data_Market_Size_and_Vendor_Revenues (last updated Feb. 19, 
2013). 
 21. See, e.g., Andrew Haberman, Policing the Information Super Highway: Customs’ Role in Digital Pi-
racy, INTELL. PROP. BRIEF, Summer 2010, at 17; Lauren Gelman, Privacy, Free Speech, and “Blurry-
Edged” Social Networks, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1315, 1318 (2009); Edward J. Eberle, The Right to Infor-
mation Self-Determination, 2001 UTAH L. REV. 965 (2001); Jeffrey B. Ritter et al., Emerging Trends 
in International Privacy Law, 15 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 87 (2001); Fred H. Cate, The Changing Face 
of Privacy Protection in the European Union and the United States, 33 IND. L. REV. 173 (1999); Do-
mingo R. Tan, Comment, Personal Privacy in the Information Age: Comparison of Internet Data Pro-
tection Regulations in the United States and the European Union, 21 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 
661 (1999). 
 22. Chris Jay Hoofnagle et al., Behavioral Advertising: The Offer You Cannot Refuse, 6 HARV. L. & POL’Y 
REV. 273, 273 (2012). 
 23. Id.  
 24. Id.  
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with the strongest privacy settings.”25 By design, these technologies inhibit consumer choice, 
obscuring the common practice of monitoring Internet behavior and collecting personal in-
formation.26 In 2010, the Wall Street Journal published several articles highlighting Internet 
monitoring. One article noted that the “nation’s 50 top websites on average installed 64 pieces 
of tracking technology onto the computers of visitors, usually with no warning.”27 As one 
commentator baldly put it: 
The information that you (insert name, address, age, income, and social se-
curity number here) read both Newsweek and your daily horoscope; buy 
Häagen-Dazs® ice cream; travel annually to New Mexico; have a standing 
prescription for Prozac® and buy a variety of different OTC antacids as well 
as a number of different brands of lubricated condoms; have joined three 
different health clubs for short sojourns over the past two years; always or-
der a salad in restaurants; never joined Weight Watchers® (and, in fact, 
have a 31” waist and a body mass index of 25); and give money to public 
television, is exceedingly valuable for the crassest of reasons: Anyone who 
has that information can sell it.28 
Non-consensual harvesting of personal data is not relegated to a few rogue businesses. 
One estimate reported ninety-two percent of web sites collect personal data.29 Another indus-
try-funded survey that included 361 web sites and 7500 servers, found that ninety-three per-
cent of those sites collected personal information.30 Monitoring, recording, collecting, and dis-
seminating private information can now be accomplished with incredible ease, tasks 
previously impracticable in the pre-Internet age.31 
The relatively infantile age of information accessibility stemming from the open architec-
ture of the Internet presents policymakers with legal problems that have little precedent out-
side of awkward and imperfect analogy.32 How can regulation retain the Internet’s benefits 
 
 25. Id. See also Christine A. Varney, Comm’r, Remarks before the Privacy & American Business Na-
tional Conference, Consumer Privacy in the Information Age: A View from the United States (Oct. 9, 
1996), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/varney/priv&ame.shtm (stating that personal infor-
mation is being collected at rate and to degree unthinkable even five years ago). 
 26. Christopher F. Carlton, The Right to Privacy in Internet Commerce: A Call for New Federal Guide-
lines and the Creation of an Independent Privacy Commission, 16 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 
393 (2002). 
 27. Julia Angwin, The Web’s New Gold Mine: Your Secrets, WALL ST. J. (July 30, 2010), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703940904575395073512989404.html. 
 28. Jessica Litman, Information Privacy/Information Property, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1283, 1285 (2000). 
 29. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS (1998), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy3/priv-23a.pdf (revealing ninety-two percent of 1402 web sites sur-
veyed collected some personal data); Scott R. Peppet, Unraveling Privacy: The Personal Prospectus 
and the Threat of a Full-Disclosure Future, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1153, 1164 (2011) (noting that corpo-
rate data mining links at least seven thousand transactions to each individual in the United States 
per year). 
 30. See Georgetown Internet Privacy Policy Survey: Report to the Federal Trade Commission (June 
1999), available at 
http://web.archive.org/web/20040204202945/http://www.msb.edu/faculty/culnanm/GIPPS/gipps1.PD
F. 
 31. See Gelman, supra note 21, at 1318 (“Most information on the Internet is captured, indexed, saved, 
and searchable.”). 
 32. See, e.g., Louis John Seminski, Jr., Tinkering with Student Free Speech: The Internet and the Need 
for a New Standard, 33 RUTGERS L.J. 165, 169–70 (2001); Russell L. Weaver, Speech and Technolo-
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while simultaneously limiting its misuses, an especially daunting task given the Internet’s 
global reach and the impracticability of linking personal data to a certain location, geography 
and/or jurisdiction? 
In this climate, the European Union has emerged as the decisive leader not only for EU 
Member Nations, but worldwide.33 Even countries that do not agree with EU policy conform 
to it.34 This Article suggests that e-commerce and the Internet spawned a new form of poli-
cymaking that enables nations to bend global law without resorting to treaties or other tradi-
tional legal tools. 
Where the globalization of commerce has been characterized by outsourcing, greater in-
ternational connectivity and transnational supply chains,35 the globalization of policymaking 
finds discrete expression in international data privacy law. The worldwide trend toward na-
tional data privacy law provides an interesting and ongoing exemplar of the future of interna-
tional policymaking. Data privacy law is a complex field wrought with divergent philosophies 
and ideals that nevertheless is achieving international conformity.36 At one end of the spec-
trum, many nations view privacy as essential—a fundamental right enjoyed by their respec-
tive citizens.37 On the other end of the spectrum, data privacy yields to free expression and 
unregulated commerce.38 Despite these, and a host of other opposing views, data privacy reg-
ulation continues to accelerate both in the number of states adopting national data privacy 
laws and, perhaps more importantly, in the harmony those laws share with each other.39 This 
Article asks how data privacy law, which itself only recently found heightened significance 
with the rise of the Internet, evolved from a confederacy of dissimilar laws to an evolving 
harmony of global legislation. 
 
gy, 110 PENN ST. L. REV. 703 (2006); Katherine S. Williams, On-Line Anonymity, Deindividuation 
and Freedom of Expression and Privacy, 110 PENN ST. L. REV. 687, 700 (2006). 
 33. Steven R. Salbu, The European Union Data Privacy Directive and International Relations, 35 VAND. 
J. TRANSNAT’L L. 655 (2002); Virginia Boyd, Financial Privacy in the United States and the Europe-
an Union: A Path to Transatlantic Regulatory Harmonization, 24 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 939, 956 
(2006); Marcia Cope Huie et al., The Right to Privacy in Personal Data: The EU Prods the U.S. and 
Controversy Continues, 9 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 391, 402–05, 454 (2002). 
 34. See Sunni Yuen, Exporting Trust with Data: Audited Self-Regulation as a Solution to Cross-Border 
Data Transfer Protection Concerns in the Offshore Outsourcing Industry, 9 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. 
REV. 41, 18–26 (2008) (detailing the sectoral laws in both India and the Philippines and the subse-
quent move to national data protection laws); Daniel R. Leathers, Giving Bite to the EU-U.S. Data 
Privacy Safe Harbor: Model Solutions for Effective Enforcement, 41 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 193, 
198–208 (2009). See generally Francesca Bignami, The Case for Tolerant Constitutional Patriotism: 
The Right to Privacy before the European Courts, 41 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 211 (2008). 
 35. See Lan Cao, Corporate and Product Identity in the Postnational Economy: Rethinking U.S. Trade 
Laws, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 401, 427–30 (2002).  
 36. See Graham Greenleaf, Global Data Privacy Laws: Forty Years of Acceleration, (Univ. of N.S.W. 
Faculty of Law, Research Series Paper No. 39, 2011), available at 
http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1308&context=unswwps-flrps11. 
 37. See, e.g., Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union pmbl., Dec. 7, 2000, 2000 O.J. (C 
364) 1 [hereinafter EU Charter]. 
 38. See Leathers, supra note 34.  
 39. See Greenleaf, supra note 36. 
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II. Privacy in Europe 
A. A Fundamental Right 
The contrast between the United States’ and European Union’s approaches to data privacy 
illustrates the unlikely harmonization of their laws. In the European Union, data privacy is a 
fundamental right.40 While the European Union has long recognized the concept of various 
fundamental rights, until recently such rights were not native to the European Union, but 
imported from national constitutions and the European Convention on Human Rights.41 
It must also be stated that fundamental rights form an integral part of the general princi-
ples of law whose observance the Court of Justice ensures. For that purpose, “the Court 
draws inspiration from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States and from 
the guidelines supplied by international instruments for the protection of human rights on 
which the Member States have collaborated or to which they are signatories.”42 
This patchwork of borrowed fundamental rights gave way, in 2000, when the European 
Union ratified its own statement of fundamental rights—the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights.43 Among the rights included in the Charter is the right to privacy.44 Importantly, the 
Charter specifies a privacy right in relation to the Internet and modern computing.45 Under 
Article 8, Protection of personal data: 
1. Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him 
or her. 
2. Such data must be processed fairly for specified purposes and on the ba-
sis of the consent of the person concerned or some other legitimate basis 
laid down by law. Everyone has the right of access to data which has been 
collected concerning him or her, and the right to have it rectified.46 
The Charter also recognizes a fundamental right to privacy in general.47 The historical or-
igins undergirding this commitment to privacy derive in part from Nazi exploitation of Euro-
pean census records preceding and during World War II. Many contend that the extensive 
accumulation of personal data by the Nazi regime facilitated pre-war abuses of human 
rights.48 In 1984, data protection experts concluded that “one of the prime motives for the 
 
 40. See Pamela Samuelson, Privacy as Intellectual Property?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1125, 1170 (2000); Tracie 
B. Loring, An Analysis of the Informational Privacy Protection Afforded by the European Union and 
the United States, 37 TEX. INT’L L.J. 421, 423 (2002). See generally Andrew T. Hopkins, The Right to 
Be Online: Europe’s Recognition of Due Process and Proportionality Requirements in Cases of Indi-
vidual Internet Disconnections, 17 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 557 (2011). 
 41. See Bignami, supra note 34, at 224. 
 42. Id. (citing Case C-305/05, Ordre des barreaux francophones et germanophone v. Conseil des Minis-
tres, 3 C.M.L.R. 28 (2007)). 
 43. EU Charter, supra note 37, pmbl. 
 44. Id. arts. 7–8.  
 45. Id. art. 8.  
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. art. 7 (“Everyone has the right to respect for his or her private and family life, home and com-
munications.”). 
 48. See Lynn Chuang Kramer, Private Eyes Are Watching You: Consumer Online Privacy Protection—
Lessons from Home and Abroad, 37 TEX. INT’L L.J. 387, 397 (2002); Michael W. Heydrich, Note, A 
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creation of data protection laws in continental Europe is the prevention of the recurrence of 
experiences in the 1930s and 1940s with Nazi and fascist regimes.”49 Such abuse in recent 
history of private and personal information undergirds European vigilance in “protecting per-
sonal privacy and resisting state intrusions into private life.”50 
A few years after World War II, the United Nations adopted the Declaration of Human 
Rights, a document that laid a foundation for legal protection of privacy rights. The Declara-
tion provided that “[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, fami-
ly, home or correspondence.”51 Several European nations enacted a series of privacy and data 
protection laws in the following decades. Sweden became the first nation to enact a compre-
hensive national data privacy law with its Data Act of 1973.52 In 1973 and 1974, the Council 
of Europe’s intergovernmental body passed resolutions recommending that member states 
adopt data protection laws.53 
In the 1980s non-governmental organizations like the Organization for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development (OECD) attempted to articulate legal principles governing data privacy 
that could be widely implemented and perhaps unify divergent national laws.54 These guide-
lines initially proved fruitless. The problem ultimately forced resolution. Multiple and con-
flicting privacy laws within Europe motivated the harmonization of privacy law, given that 
conflicting privacy laws discourage commerce and the free flow of information from one na-
tion to the next.55 Over fifteen years after the OECD articulated proposed data privacy guide-
 
Brave New World: Complying with the European Union Directive on Personal Privacy through the 
Power of Contract, 25 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 407, 417 (1999). 
 49. COLIN J. BENNETT, REGULATING PRIVACY: DATA PROTECTION AND PUBLIC POLICY IN EUROPE AND 
THE UNITED STATES 1, 30 (1992) (quoting David H. Flaherty, Nineteen Eighty-Four and After, 1 
GOV’T INFO. Q. 431 (1984)). 
 50. Lee Dembart, The End User/A Voice for the Consumer: Privacy Undone, N.Y. TIMES (June 10, 
2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/06/10/business/worldbusiness/10iht-itend10_ed3_.html. 
 51. Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 12 G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 
10, 1948). 
 52. David Banisar & Simon Davies, Global Trends in Privacy Protection: An International Survey of 
Privacy, Data Protection, and Surveillance Laws and Developments, 18 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & 
INFO. L. 1, 95 (1999). But see Heydrich, supra note 48, at 417 (suggesting that the United States 
originated the right to privacy and that the first data privacy legislation was passed in the German 
state of Hesse in 1970). 
 53. See Council of Europe, Comm. of Ministers, Protection of the Privacy of Individuals vis-à-vis Elec-
tronic Data Banks in the Private Sector, 224th Mtg., Res. (73) 22 (Sept. 26, 1973), available at 
https://wcd.coe.int/com.instranet.InstraServlet?command=com.instranet.CmdBlobGet&InstranetIm
age=589402&SecMode=1&DocId=646994&Usage=2; Council of Europe, Comm. of Ministers, Protec-
tion of the Privacy of Individuals vis-à-vis Electronic Data Banks in the Public Sector, 236th Mtg., 
Res. (74) 29 (Sept. 20, 1974), available at 
https://wcd.coe.int/com.instranet.InstraServlet?command=com.instranet.CmdBlobGet&InstranetIm
age=590512&SecMode=1&DocId=649498&Usage=2. 
 54. The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) is an international economic 
organization of over thirty countries founded in 1961 to stimulate economic growth and world trade. 
It was originated in 1947 to run the U.S.-financed Marshall Plan for reconstruction of a war-torn 
continent. History, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/about/history/ (last visited Apr. 5, 2013). For back-
ground information on OECD, see BENNETT, supra note 49, at 136–40. 
 55. See Patrick J. Murray, Comment, The Adequacy Standard under Directive 95/46/EC: Does U.S. 
Data Protection Meet This Standard?, 21 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 932, 949–51 (1998). 
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lines, those guidelines would largely become the template for binding legislation throughout 
Europe.56 
In 1990, the Commission of the former European Community drafted a proposed Council 
Directive on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data.57 
After some revision, the European Parliament approved the draft Directive on March 11, 
1992,58 and the elusive goal of European unity with regard to data privacy law grew closer 
with the formal enactment of Council Directive 95/46/EC on October 24, 1995. 
B. The European Union Directive 
The 1995 European Directive marked a sea of change in the previously elusive attempts at 
unifying data privacy law in Europe. Although almost twenty years old, the Directive remains 
the single most impactful data privacy law worldwide.59 The Directive’s twin purposes seek to 
(1) protect fundamental privacy rights, and (2) promote the “free flow of personal data be-
tween Member States.”60 To do so, the Directive imposes restrictions on organizations that 
process personal data and grants rights of access and correction to “data subjects”—EU resi-
dents protected by the Directive.61 
Specifically, the Directive requires each of the European Union’s twenty-seven Member 
States to pass a privacy law that encompasses both government and private entities that pro-
cess personal data.62 These national laws are not relegated to specific industries, such as the 
medical or financial industries, but reach all processing of data relating to an EU resident’s 
personal information.63 Data processors must comply with a number of “data quality princi-
ples.” Personal data must be: (a) processed fairly and lawfully; (b) collected for legitimate and 
specified reasons; (c) adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purposes for 
which it is collected; (d) accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date; and, (e) retained as 
identifiable data for no longer than necessary to serve the purposes for which the data were 
collected.64 
These requirements may appear harmless, but they implicate a world of transactions: they 
would arguably bar a bank from reviewing its own customer files for good prospects, limit 
market estate planning services, as well as restrict an employer from keeping records or 
 
 56. See Kramer, supra note 48, at 390 (citing JOHN DICKIE, INTERNET AND ELECTRONIC COMMERCE LAW 
IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 55–64 (1999)). 
 57. Proposal for a Council Directive Concerning the Protection of Personal Data and Privacy in the Con-
text of Public Digital Telecommunications Networks, in Particular the Integrated Services Digital 
Network (ISDN) and Public Digital Mobile Networks, COM (1990) 314 final (July 27, 1990). 
 58. European Parliament and Council Directive 95/46/EC, art. 5, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31995L0046:en:HTML [hereinafter 
Data Protection Directive]. 
 59. See Gregory Shaffer, Globalization and Social Protection: The Impact of EU and International Rules 
in the Ratcheting Up of U.S. Privacy Standards, 25 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 55–88 (2000); Ryan Moshell, 
Comment, . . . And Then There Was One: The Outlook for a Self-Regulatory United States Amidst a 
Global Trend toward Comprehensive Data Protection, 37 TEX. TECH L. REV. 357, 384 (2005). 
 60. See Data Protection Directive, supra note 58, art. 1. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. art. 8. 
 64. Id. art. 6.  
Diminishing Sovereignty 
431 
backup files for several years.65 If relegated to the twenty-seven Member States of the Euro-
pean Union, these requirements may indeed seem innocuous, but the Directive’s reach far 
exceeds its grasp.66 While the European Union has no jurisdiction to directly bind those states 
outside its union, the Directive endeavors to do so anyway.67 It does so (1) by broadly defining 
“processing personal information”68 and (2) by prohibiting transfers of personal data to enti-
ties that fail to ensure an “adequate level of protection.”69 
1. Processing Personal Information 
The Directive’s wide-ranging breadth and reach find expression in the definitions of those 
who must comply.70 Three definitions, all generous in scope, capture more than they exclude: 
The Directive applies to (1) personal data, that is (2) processed by (3) controllers or processors. 
“Personal data” is defined in the Directive as: “any information relating to an identified or 
identifiable natural person (‘data subject’); an identifiable person is one who can be identified, 
directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identification number or to one or more 
factors specific to his physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social identity.”71 
Personal data is not limited to a lay understanding. It includes more than names, national 
identification numbers, bank accounts, and addresses.72 It encompasses information that can 
lead to identification directly or indirectly. Labeled an “expansionist view,” it is “irrelevant if 
information has already been linked to a particular person, or might be so linked in the fu-
ture; this view treats identified and identifiable data as equivalent.”73 Data becomes personal 
information when it enables anyone to link information to a specific person, even if the person 
or entity holding that data cannot make that link.74 
The Data Protection Working Party, a representative body drawn from EU Member States 
and charged with fostering consistent interpretation of the Directive’s requirements, issued 
an opinion in 2007 clarifying the definition of personal information.75 The Working Party de-
termined that a person is “identifiable” when, “although the person has not been identified 
 
 65. Donald C. Dowling, Jr., Global HR Hot Topic—May 2007: Global HRIS and EU Data Privacy Law 
Compliance, GLOBAL HR HOT TOPIC (Case & White LLP, New York, N.Y.), May 2007, available at 
http://www.whitecase.com/hrhottopic_0507/#.UV4hE6KiYbQ. 
 66. Robert Browning wrote that a person’s “reach should exceed his grasp, [o]r what’s a heaven for?” 
JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 542–43 (15th ed. 1980). 
 67. See Christopher Kuner, Beyond Safe Harbor: European Data Protection Law and Electronic Com-
merce, 35 INT’L LAW. 79, 87 (2001). 
 68. Data Protection Directive, supra note 58, art. 2(a). 
 69. Id. pmbl. recital 57, art. 25(1).  
 70. See Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J. Solove, The PII Problem: Privacy and a New Concept of Personal-
ly Identifiable Information, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1814 (2011). 
 71. Data Protection Directive, supra note 58, art. 2(a). 
 72. See Schwartz & Solove, supra note 70, at 1819. 
 73. See id. at 1817 (arguing that information privacy regulations rest on an unstable and ill-defined 
concept of personally identifiable information). 
 74. Id.  
 75. See Data Prot. Working Party, Opinion 4/2007 on the Concept of Personal Data, 01248/07/EN, WP 
136 (June 20, 2007), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2007/wp136_en.pdf.  
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yet, it is possible to do it.”76 Information need not identify an individual with specificity to 
constitute “personal data;” the mere fact that the information is related to an individual ca-
pable of being identified qualifies it as “personal data” under the Directive.77 One commenta-
tor has suggested that “anyone who posts personal information about another person on his 
or her own social networking profile or uses personal information from another person’s pro-
file could be deemed a ‘data controller’ subject to the data protection obligations of the Di-
rective.”78 
The Directive combines the broad definition of personal data with a broad definition of 
“data processing:” “any operation or set of operations which is performed upon personal data, 
whether or not by automatic means, such as collection, recording, organization, storage, adap-
tation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or 
otherwise making available, alignment or combination, blocking, erasure or destruction.”79 
Any collection, use, and transfer—even the redaction and deletion thereof—constitutes 
“processing.”80 This definition intentionally encompasses data processed automatically as 
part of a filing system.81 The Directive defines those deemed to have “processed” personal da-
ta as either data controllers or data processors. A data controller is “the natural or legal per-
son, public authority, agency or any other body which alone or jointly with others determines 
the purposes and means of the processing of personal data.”82 Data controller, thusly defined, 
captures more than big businesses and data aggregators like Corelogic, Datalogix, EBureau, 
and ID Analytics. As one commentator notes, children recording orders for Girl Scout cookies, 
individuals organizing their business contacts, and students operating websites that require 
registration all qualify as data controllers.83 
These purposefully broad definitions capture a wide array of organizations that “process” 
“personal data.”84 But entities and individuals outside the twenty-seven Member States of the 
European Union might claim exemption from its jurisdictional reach. The Directive, however, 
encompasses a surprisingly broad range of non-E.U. entities by forbidding transfers of per-
sonal data. 
2. Data Transfers 
“Because of its potential effect on other nations that interact with or do business in Eu-
rope, [the data-flow restriction] may be the most controversial feature of the Directive.”85 The 
Directive levies significant restrictions on those entities in the European Union that process 
 
 76. Id.  
 77. PRIVACY AND DATA SECURITY LAW DESKBOOK § 18.02[A] (Lisa J. Sotto ed., 2010). 
 78. Bennett, supra note 9, at 186. 
 79. Data Protection Directive, supra note 58, art. 2(b). 
 80. Id.  
 81. Id. pmbl. recital 15, art. 5. 
 82. Id. art. 2(d). 
 83. See Cate, supra note 21, at 183. 
 84. See Schwartz & Solove, supra note 70. 
 85. Steven R. Salbu, Regulation of Borderless High-Technology Economies: Managing Spillover Effects, 
3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 137, 137 (2002). 
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personal information.86 This added cost of business had potential for creating unintended yet 
foreseen consequences, namely incentivizing companies to outsource data processing beyond 
E.U. borders.87 A company doing business in Spain might decide, for example, to relocate its 
principle place of business outside the European Union to avoid the cost of complying with 
the Directive. To forestall such an exodus, Article 4 of the Directive extends its reach to 
“equipment” within a Member State.88 
Each Member State shall apply the national provisions it adopts pursuant to the Directive 
to the processing of personal data where “the controller is not established on Community ter-
ritory and, for purposes of processing personal data makes use of equipment, automated or 
otherwise, situated on the territory of the said Member State, unless such equipment is used 
only for purposes of transit through the territory of the Community.”89 
This provision not only dissuades EU companies from relocating, it also reaches a host of 
non-EU entities. Many organizations headquartered in countries outside the European Union 
have been surprised to learn of their obligation to comply with EU law. A U.S. company based 
in Ohio engaged in e-commerce must comply with the Directive if that company uses “cook-
ies” to sell items online and has even one EU customer.90 A cookie, generally understood, in-
stalls a program on the consumer’s computer that tracks and remembers transactions.91 The 
shopping cart icon that “remembers” what a customer selects and puts those selections in a 
virtual shopping cart serves as a common illustration.92 Because an EU customer’s computer 
is used in the transaction due to the “cookie” installed on that computer, EU-based “equip-
ment” is used for the purpose of processing personal data and the strictures of the Directive 
apply.93 The national law of the Member State in which the customer’s computer is located 
governs the data processing conducted by the Ohio company. 
Many have criticized this provision as overreaching, especially when applied to non-EU 
based entities processing intra-company data housed outside the European Union.94 Such 
criticisms do not solely target the “equipment” provision outlined above because the Directive 
includes additional restrictions on data transfers that are arguably more intrusive. In other 
words, the Directive’s reach does not stop with data processing that uses EU-based “equip-
 
 86. Id. at 140–41.  
 87. See PRIVACY AND DATA SECURITY LAW DESKBOOK, supra note 77, § 18.02[A][1][c]. 
 88. Data Protection Directive, supra note 58, art. 4. 
 89. Id. art. 4(c). 
 90. See Hoofnagle et al., supra note 22, at 276 (“One way that websites track users is through ‘cookies,’ 
small text files that typically contain a string of numbers that can be used to identify a computer. 
For instance, a website might set a tracking cookie on a user’s computer with a key (a fancy word for 
the cookie name) such as ‘id’ and value (the unique identifier assigned to a user) such as 
‘123456789.’ Advertisers can then access the ‘id’ cookie and track how user 123456789 visits differ-
ent websites.”). 
 91. See id.  
 92. Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, To Track or “Do Not Track”: Advancing Transparency and Individ-
ual Control in Online Behavioral Advertising, 13 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 281 (2012). 
 93. See PRIVACY AND DATA SECURITY LAW DESKBOOK, supra note 77, § 18.02[A][1][c]. 
 94. See, e.g., Kuner, supra note 67, at 87. 
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ment.”95 The Directive specifically targets data transfers to “third countries,” outlining a host 
of requirements before personal data can leave Europe.96 
Article 25, in fact, baldly prohibits the transfer of personal data to a third country (any 
Non-EU or European Economic Area (EEA) country) unless the European Commission 
(“Commission”) deems that country has an “adequate level of protection.”97 Data about EU 
residents can only go to those countries that have enacted data protection laws that the 
Commission deems “adequate.”98 Given the broad definition of “personal information,” the 
global economy, and the free flow of data over the Internet, this restriction appears unman-
ageable at best. The Commission currently recognizes only nine countries as adequately com-
pliant: Andorra, Argentina, Canada, Faroe Islands, Guernsey, the Isle of Man, Israel, Jersey, 
and Switzerland.99 
To join this very short list, the Commission conducts a formal evaluation of the transferee 
country’s laws and practices. The transferee country “shall be assessed in the light of all the 
circumstances surrounding a data transfer,” including the nature of the data, the purpose 
and duration of the proposed processing, the “rules of law, both general and sectoral,” in the 
transferee country, and the “professional rules and security measures which are complied 
with in that country.”100 The formal designation as “adequate” allows transmission of person-
al data from France to Argentina as if the same information was transferred from France to 
Spain.101 Again, only nine countries have met the standard. 
The heart of this Article suggests that the European Union, through the Directive, is forc-
ing international compliance even from nations that would resist it. If only nine nations com-
ply with the Directive in a manner sufficient to meet the EU standard, how does the Directive 
ensure compliance from the rest of the international community? Does this mean that data 
about EU residents can only exist within the EU and nine random countries? 
 
 95. Data Protection Directive, supra note 58, art 25. 
 96. Id.  
 97. Id. art. 25(1). 
 98. Id.  
 99. See Greenleaf, supra note 36, at 3 n.2. 
 100. Article 25(2) of the Directive articulates five factors: (1) the nature of the data, (2) the purpose and 
duration of the processing operation, (3) the country of origin and the country of final destination, (4) 
the rule of law in force in the third country, and (5) the professional rules and security measures ad-
hered to and implemented by the receiving entity in the third country. Data Protection Directive, 
supra note 58, art. 25(2). The prohibition in Article 25 is subject to exemptions, provided in Article 
26, when (1) the data subject has consented “unambiguously” to the transfer; (2) the transfer is nec-
essary to the performance of a contract between the data subject and the controller or of a contract 
in the interest of the data subject concluded between the controller and a third party; (3) the trans-
fer is legally required or necessary to serve an “important public interest;” (4) the transfer is neces-
sary to protect “the vital interests of the data subject;” or (5) the transfer is from a “register which 
according to laws or regulations is intended to provide information to the public and which is open to 
consultation either by the public in general or by any person who can demonstrate legitimate inter-
est.” Id. art. 26. 
 101. Id.  
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3. Enabling Transfers That Conform 
As mentioned, the Directive forbids transfer of EU personal data to countries like the 
United States because the Commission finds U.S. data protection laws inadequate; that is, 
unless “adequacy” can be established by other means.102 In practice, the adequacy require-
ment has been relaxed to apply on an ad hoc individual basis, rather than by nationality. 
Three avenues103—outside of a formal nationwide adequacy finding—allow non-EU entities 
to receive and process EU personal data: (1) binding/model contracts, (2) binding corporate 
rules, and (3) safe harbor self-regulation.104 
Model contracts allow legal transmission of personal data outside of Europe by requiring 
“binding,” “standard,” or “model” contractual clauses.105 The Directive empowers the Com-
mission to approve transfers of personal data even to third countries that fail to ensure an 
“adequate level of protection” if the data controller erects “sufficient safeguards” via “certain 
standard contractual clauses” consistent with a “Commission’s decision.”106 Under this ap-
proach, the contractual clauses incorporate by reference the data protection laws of the Mem-
ber State in which the data exporter is established. 
 
 102. Donald C. Dowling, Jr., International Data Protection and Privacy Law, INT’L EMP. PRAC. (Case & 
White LLP, New York, N.Y.), Aug. 2009, at 10 (“Under a strict reading of the Directive’s article 
25(1), personal data transmissions to any other country would appear flatly illegal. . .”), available at 
http://www.whitecase.com/files/Publication/367982f8-6dc9-478e-ab2f-
5fdf2d96f84a/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/30c48c85-a6c4-4c37-84bd-
6a4851f87a77/article_IntlDataProtectionandPrivacyLaw_v5.pdf.  
 103. The Directive’s article 26(1) authorizes a number of other exceptions legally to transmit personal 
data outside of Europe even to a “third country” that fails to offer an “adequate level of protection.” 
Data Protection Directive, supra note 58, art. 26(1). A data controller or processor can legally send 
personal data outside of Europe to the United States, or any other country, if: 
(a) the data subject has [freely] given his consent unambiguously to the proposed transfer [to 
be enforceable, a consent must indeed be unambiguous and freely given; EU data authori-
ties take the position that a consent must specifically list the categories of data and the pur-
poses for the processing outside the EU; in the employment context, consents may be 
deemed presumptively not freely given, merely because of the imbalance in bargaining pow-
er between employer and employee]; or 
(b) the transfer is necessary [not merely convenient] for the performance of a contract be-
tween the data subject and the controller or the implementation of precontractual measures 
taken in response to the data subject’s request; or 
(c) the transfer is necessary [not merely convenient] for the conclusion or performance of a 
contract concluded in the interest of the data subject between the controller and a third par-
ty; or 
(d) the transfer is necessary [not merely convenient] or legally required on important public 
interest grounds, or for the establishment, exercise or defense of legal claims; or (e) the 
transfer is necessary [not merely convenient] in order to protect the vital interests of the da-
ta subject; or 
(f) the transfer is made from a register which according to laws or regulations is intended to 
provide information to the public and which is open to consultation either by the public in 
general or by any person who can demonstrate legitimate interest, to the extent that the 
conditions laid down in law for consultation are fulfilled in the particular case.  
 Id.  
 104. See Leathers, supra note 34, at 199–200. 
 105. See Data Protection Directive, supra note 58, art. 26(4). 
 106. Id.  
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Binding corporate rules function similarly, but serve a more permanent, less ad hoc pur-
pose.107 Binding corporate rules track EU data protection standards and allow multinational 
organizations to conduct business with EU counterparts without having to draw up model 
contract language for every transaction.108 The relevant Member State’s data protection 
agency must approve binding corporate rules, which can be an arduous and lengthy pro-
cess.109 As a result, relatively few binding corporate rules have been approved.110 
4. Safe Harbor: The American Exception 
Finally, organizations and individuals in the United States can comply with the Directive 
and thereby receive and process personal data from the European Union if they self-certify 
under the Safe Harbor provision. The Safe Harbor provision—available only in the United 
States—represents a compromise between EU and U.S. regulators.111 As laid out below, the 
United States’ aversion to data privacy regulation, coupled with uneven enforcement, under-
mines the European Union’s view of data privacy as a fundamental right. 
The Directive drew a hard line by outlawing data transfers to any third country that fails 
to offer “adequate” data protection, presenting a live threat to U.S.-based companies reliant 
on data from their own European employees, customers, suppliers, and associates.112 The Eu-
ropean Union has not waivered from its characterization of U.S. privacy law as “inadequate” 
to protect privacy rights because of U.S. piecemeal privacy regulations.113 It is not difficult to 
imagine the range of transactions affected by such a severe restriction of data. A U.S. multi-
national company with employees or customers in the European Union would have to pull 
down or drastically restructure interactive websites and company intranets, stop customer 
reservations, delete frequent-customer databases, discontinue customer help lines, discard 
customer and employee directories, discontinue routine financial transactions including credit 
card transactions and check-clearing, and overhaul or discontinue routine mail, express de-
livery documents, e-mails, and telephone calls. “As soon as the Directive became effective in 
1998, it became clear that it actively threatened data flows between the two largest trading 
partners on Earth.”114 As one commenter put it, such action “would immediately destroy a 
$1.5 trillion transatlantic economic relationship.”115 
The U.S. Department of Commerce and the European Commission bargained for two 
years before agreeing to a “Safe Harbor” exception in 2000, avoiding serious disruption be-
 
 107. This option was created by the Data Protection Working Party, which is an advisory body that was 
created by article 29 of the Data Directive. See Data Protection Directive, supra note 58, art. 29.  
 108. See PROSKAUER ON PRIVACY: A GUIDE TO PRIVACY AND DATA SECURITY LAW IN THE INFORMATION 
AGE § 14-3 (Christopher Wolf ed., 2007). 
 109. See PRIVACY AND DATA SECURITY LAW DESKBOOK, supra note 77, § 18.02[B]. 
 110. See id. 
 111. See Leathers, supra note 34.  
 112. See Data Protection Directive, supra note 58, art. 25. 
 113. See Leathers, supra note 34, at 198. 
 114. Dowling, supra note 102. 
 115. See Stephen R. Bergerson, Electronic Commerce in the 21st Century: Article E-Commerce Privacy 
and the Black Hole of Cyberspace, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1527, 1550 (2001). 
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tween the trading partners.116 The compromise sought to bridge the differing approaches in 
the European Union and the United States, simplify the means for U.S. organizations to 
comply with the EU Directive, and shield EU organizations that transfer personal data to 
U.S. organizations.117 Eligibility for Safe Harbor protections requires U.S. organizations to be 
subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) or the Department of 
Transportation.118 The Safe Harbor requirements themselves largely track the Directive’s re-
quirements, although not precisely.119 
The Safe Harbor privacy principles are essentially those required by the Data Directive: 
(1) notice; (2) choice; (3) onward transfer; (4) security; (5) data integration; (6) access; and (7) 
enforcement.120 Consequently, it appears that the Safe Harbor provision merely mirrors the 
Directive, raising the query: How is the Safe Harbor a “compromise” between EU regulators 
intent on forcing U.S. compliance with the Directive and U.S. officials anxious to avoid the 
same? The compromise is embodied by the voluntary and largely self-regulatory implementa-
tion of these data protections.121 
Companies that apply for Safe Harbor self-certify that they comply with the restrictions 
listed above. No government official reviews or authorizes whether any given company in fact 
complies with Safe Harbor principles before awarding certification.122 Instead, the Depart-
ment of Commerce keeps an online list of entities that certify their compliance with Safe 
Harbor.123 A company need only notify the U.S. Department of Commerce that it intends to 
comply with Safe Harbor and publicly declare compliance on its website.124 
 
 116. See U.S.-EU & U.S.-Swiss Safe Harbor Frameworks, EXPORT.GOV, http://www.export.gov/safeharbor 
(last updated Apr. 11, 2012, 2:45 PM) [hereinafter Safe Harbor Frameworks]; see also documents 
adopted by the Data Protection Working Party 1999, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-
protection/document/index_en.htm. 
 117. See Safe Harbor Frameworks, supra note 116. 
 118. See Safe Harbor Overviews, EXPORT.GOV, http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/eg_main_018236.asp. 
 119. Kamaal Zaidi, Harmonizing U.S.-EU Online Privacy Laws: Toward a U.S. Comprehensive Regime 
for the Protection of Personal Data, 12 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 169, 170 (2003) (“Using the EU Di-
rective’s principles, the Safe Harbor creates a scheme by which U.S. companies are required to com-
ply with stricter privacy standards relating to the transfer of online personal data. With respect to 
U.S. privacy law, this Safe Harbor regime substitutes the predominant sectoral approach with a 
more comprehensive approach.”). But see Morey Elizabeth Barnes, Comment, Falling Short of the 
Mark: The United States Response to the European Union’s Data Privacy Directive, 27 NW. J. INT’L 
L. & BUS. 171, 182 (2006) (suggesting EU officials may soon “reconsider whether the Safe Harbor 
really mirrors the letter and spirit of the Data Privacy Directive”). 
 120. See PRIVACY AND DATA SECURITY LAW DESKBOOK, supra note 77, § 18.02[B]. 
 121. See Leathers, supra note 34, at 201 (“The Safe Harbor is a voluntary self-certification system that is 
unique to the U.S. . . . .”). 
 122. See U.S.-EU Safe Harbor List, EXPORT.GOV, https://safeharbor.export.gov/list.aspx (“In maintaining 
the list, the Department of Commerce does not assess and makes no representations to the adequa-
cy of any organization’s privacy policy or its adherence to that policy. Furthermore, the Department 
of Commerce does not guarantee the accuracy of the list and assumes no liability for the erroneous 
inclusion, misidentification, omission, or deletion of any organization, or any other action related to 
the maintenance of the list.”) (last visited Apr. 5, 2013). 
 123. See id.  
 124. Id. See also PRIVACY AND DATA SECURITY LAW DESKBOOK, supra note 77, § 18.02[B]. 
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5. Safe Harbor: Compromise and Criticism 
Neither the European Union nor the United States fully embrace the Safe Harbor provi-
sion. While the European Union views privacy as a fundamental right, safeguarded by the 
Directive and directly administered and enforced by public authorities, U.S. officials view da-
ta privacy as a matter of compromise, and advocate private-sector self-regulation as the best 
method of enforcing privacy principles.125 
EU officials criticize self-regulation, noting that many of the few organizations that have 
self-certified do not in fact comply with Safe Harbor principles. Two years into the Safe Har-
bor agreement, an EU Commission issued a working paper that reported significant non-
compliance.126 Many U.S. companies that claimed to protect private data lacked “the expected 
degree of transparency as regards their overall commitment or as regards the contents of 
their privacy policies.”127 The Commission found that U.S. companies often failed to display 
the mandatory public statement of adherence to the Safe Harbor principles, and that many of 
the privacy statements that the Commission did locate inaccurately reflected Safe Harbor 
principles.128 The Commission concluded that “less than half of organisations post privacy 
policies that reflect all seven Safe Harbor Principles.”129 
Finally, only a fraction of U.S. entities eligible for Safe Harbor have sought certification. A 
significant block of companies that would suffer “severe, adverse effects” if data transfers 
from the European Union were blocked have ignored the Safe Harbor altogether.130 “U.S. 
firms, even those within the Safe Harbor, are largely ignoring data-protection standards.”131 
As of October 2006, approximately 1000 companies were participating in the program, 190 of 
which were “not current” in their certification.132 Given the cost of implementing data privacy 
controls and the concomitant risk of prosecution,133 questions remain regarding whether 
 
 125. Tanith L. Balaban, Comprehensive Data Privacy Legislation: Why Now Is the Time, 1 CASE W. RES. 
J.L. TECH. & INTERNET 1, 7 (2009).  
 126. Commission Decision 2000/518/EC, 2000 O.J. (L 215) 1, available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2000:215:0001:0003:EN:PDF [hereinafter Com-
mission Decision 2000/518/EC]. 
 127. Commission Staff Working Paper, at 2, SEC (2002) 196 (Feb. 13, 2002). 
 128. Id.; Joel R. Reidenberg, Setting Standards for Fair Information Practice in the U.S. Private Sector, 
80 IOWA L. REV. 497, 500 (1995) (“Despite the growth of the Information Society, the United States 
has resisted all calls for omnibus or comprehensive legal rules for fair information practice in the 
private sector. Legal rules have developed on an ad hoc, targeted basis, while industry has elaborat-
ed voluntary norms and practices for particular problems. Over the years, there has been an almost 
zealous adherence to this ideal of narrowly targeted standards.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 129. Commission Staff Working Paper, supra note 127, at 9.  
 130. Barnes, supra note 119, at 181. 
 131. Moshell, supra note 59, at 387 (citing Adam Eisner, U.S. Firms Still Ignoring EU Privacy Regula-
tions, THEWHIR.COM (Aug. 14, 2003), http://www.thewhir.com/web-hosting-news/us-firms-still-
ignoring-eu-privacy-regulations). 
 132. Barnes, supra note 119, at 181–82.  
 133. See Loring, supra note 40, at 459 (“The unwillingness of U.S. organizations to participate in the safe 
harbor can be attributed to factors such as uncertainty over enforcement issues, compliance costs, 
and a reluctance to be one of the first organizations to test the safe harbor. In addition, organiza-
tions may not be subscribing to the safe harbor because the EU Directive has no authority outside of 
Europe.” (footnotes omitted)). 
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more U.S. organizations will self-certify, and whether those that have self-certified will in fact 
comply.134 
Aside from criticisms involving self-certification, many privacy advocates lament the Safe 
Harbor enforcement scheme. In the European Union, the Directive requires enforcement sole-
ly through government agencies.135 The Data Protection Authority in each EU Member State 
enforces its respective data privacy law.136 In fact, some Member States require all data col-
lectors and processors to file annual reports.137 Conversely, enforcement of U.S. Safe Harbor 
provisions involves a number of self-regulatory stages before meaningful government inter-
vention ensues, leading one scholar to note that “[p]rivate-sector enforcement is the principal 
method of assuring compliance with the Safe Harbor Principles.”138 
The first enforcement stage involves self-certification. Organizations may either conduct a 
self-assessment or hire a third party to verify certification.139 Third party assessors, like BBB 
Online or TRUSTe, certify that the organization has a properly posted privacy policy, that the 
policy adheres to Safe Harbor provisions, and that the organization in fact complies with its 
own policy.140 Private-sector enforcement calls for implantation of a dispute resolution system 
to investigate and reconcile consumer complaints and empowers the mediator, arbitrator or 
other dispute resolution body with the ability to sanction an organization that cannot demon-
strate the required level of privacy protection.141 
As a result, an EU resident concerned about her personal data must first contact the U.S. 
company directly. The complainant could then pursue a grievance by contacting the third 
party company that verified compliance with the Safe Harbor provisions and argue that the 
company failed to adhere to its own privacy policy.142 If the third party agrees with the com-
plainant, it directs the company to remedy the infraction. If the company fails to do so, the 
third party must refer the case to the agency with jurisdiction, invariably the FTC.143 Even 
then, the FTC has discretion whether or not to investigate.144 EU officials, dissatisfied with 
Safe Harbor provisions, note that it took the FTC nine years to bring its first data privacy en-
 
 134. See David Raj Nijhawan, The Emperor Has No Clothes: A Critique of Applying the European Union 
Approach to Privacy Regulation in the United States, 56 VAND. L. REV. 939, 945 (2003) (noting that 
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forcement action.145 The FTC prosecuted a U.S. company that misrepresented its compliance 
with Safe Harbor principles. 
Although Safe Harbor provisions require U.S. entities to treat EU personal data as if that 
data were physically in Europe and subject to the Data Directive,146 the Safe Harbor is a vol-
untary self-certification system that is unique to the United States and arguably suffers from 
inadequate enforcement.147 The private sector remains reluctant to implement Safe Harbor 
principles, and many of the few companies that have self-certified do not in fact comply with 
Safe Harbor principles.148 
C. International Trend 
This Article’s central premise asks how the European Union forced international compli-
ance with its data privacy Directive, a regulation described by one scholar as “the most rigor-
ous privacy legislation the world has seen.”149 That query requires an understanding of Euro-
pean history and the subsequent adoption of privacy as a fundamental right. The Directive is 
the legal codification of this deep-seated belief, providing a range of protections for EU resi-
dents and their private data.150 Private data, however, knows no borders in the Internet 
age.151 Private data is no longer confined to paper dossiers and metal file cabinets, but can be 
many places at once, travel at light speed from one nation to the next, and can be readily col-
lected without notice or consent. 
As private data operates without borders, so must the Directive. It is this component of the 
Directive that bears emphasis especially in light of the seeming success obtained in securing 
international conformity.152 Broad and encompassing definitions of “personal information” 
and data “processing,” in conjunction with restrictions on data transfers, encourage interna-
tional compliance at the risk of exclusion from the European market.153 The Directive allows 
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data transfers both on a national and an ad hoc basis, but only after binding the transferee to 
the data protections articulated in the Directive.154 
Although many nations have not historically embraced privacy as a fundamental right, 
the clear trend in global privacy law reflects an increasing adherence to EU privacy princi-
ples.155 The first comprehensive national data privacy law, Sweden’s Data Act of 1973, 
marked the beginning. The forty years that followed produced at least seventy-five more na-
tions adopting similar national data privacy laws. “The picture that emerges is that data pri-
vacy laws are spreading globally, and their number and geographical diversity accelerating 
since 2000.”156 There were seven new national omnibus privacy laws in the 1970s, ten in the 
1980s, nineteen in the 1990s, thirty-two in the 2000s and eight so far in the first two years of 
this decade.157 At the current rate of expansion, fifty new laws will emerge in this decade.158 
The most economically significant nations notably absent are China and the United States. 
The Directive’s initial success in swaying international compliance is by no means complete. 
The United States has long resisted comprehensive data privacy laws, and its beleaguered 
economy seeks to optimize those industries—like data aggregation and analytics—that show 
promise. The next five years will reveal whether the Directive’s reach will flip U.S. reluctance 
into begrudged acceptance, or at last meet an obstacle that cannot be moved. 
III. Privacy in America 
The centralized approach exemplified by the European Union favors data protection ac-
complished by comprehensive legislation. By contrast, data protection laws in the United 
States are decentralized, fragmented, industry-specific, and largely uncoordinated among 
varying levels of government.159 “While the European Union enacts legislation to counter 
market forces, the United States, in comparison, focuses less on government intervention in 
the private sector and, instead, places a greater emphasis on market constraints.”160 The Eu-
ropean approach is comprehensive, proactive, and preventative, whereas the United States 
relies on a salmagundi of laws including provisions in federal and state constitutions, federal 
and state statutes, federal and state regulations, common law, municipal ordinances, and 
self-regulatory practices.161 This disjointed and largely reactive compendium of privacy regu-
lation has earned the widely-used moniker “sectoral.”162 
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The industries beholden to data protection legislation are those that traditionally handle 
sensitive data,163 and the laws are often customized, targeting discrete elements of sensitive 
data or particular uses thereof.164 Examples of the U.S. sectoral approach include the Tele-
communications Act of 1996, which restricts telecommunications carriers’ use of private cus-
tomer information;165 the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, which restricts financial institutions’ use 
and dissemination of private financial data;166 and the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions 
Act, which restricts credit reporting and increases protections for related personal infor-
mation.167 Whereas the European Directive articulates a single definition of personal infor-
mation that governs its twenty-seven Member States,168 the U.S. sectoral approach breeds 
multiple, often disparate, definitions. The definition of personal data under the Fair Credit 
Reporting Act,169 for example, differs from the Video Privacy Protection Act,170 which differs 
from the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act.171 
The self-regulatory aspect of U.S. data privacy protections emerges most clearly through 
the Safe Harbor provisions discussed above. Another self-regulatory industry separate from 
the Safe Harbor exists in credit card privacy regulation. The credit card industry requires 
companies that store, process, or transmit credit card information to institute and enforce a 
security policy, encrypt specified credit card information, and report lost data.172 
All told, the United States certainly legislates and enforces an array of privacy protections. 
Those protections, however, are not uniform and comprehensive but instead resemble an un-
coordinated patchwork of sectoral privacy laws.173 Efforts to unify data privacy laws by enact-
ing comprehensive legislation have been consistently rejected.174 Many project that a com-
prehensive data privacy law is unlikely in the near term,175 a projection that highlights U.S. 
aversion to comprehensive data privacy regulation. Perhaps an industry-specific and self-
regulatory approach to data privacy is superior to national, omnibus regulation. In consider-
ing whether the European Directive, coupled with the international trend favoring national 
privacy legislation, will eventually catch up and envelope the United States, it is important to 
examine the U.S. rationale for resisting the same. 
 
 163. See PRIVACY AND DATA SECURITY LAW DESKBOOK, supra note 77, § 1.01. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-104, 110 Stat 56 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. 
(1996)). 
 166. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801–09 (1999). 
 167. Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2006). 
 168. See Data Protection Directive, supra note 58, art. 2. 
 169. FCRA § 1681(b) (applying to consumer reporting agencies that provide consumer reports, defined as 
communications by such an agency bearing on a consumer’s credit worthiness or personal character-
istics when used to establish consumer’s eligibility in certain contexts). 
 170. Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2002) (defining personally identifiable in-
formation as “information which identifies a person”). 
 171. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, § 6809(4)(A) (defining “personally identifiable financial infor-
mation” as “nonpublic personal information”). 
 172. Mark MacCarthy, Information Security Policy in the U.S. Retail Payments Industry, 2011 STAN. 
TECH. L. REV. 3, 3–6, 11–12 (2011). 
 173. Cate, supra note 21 (noting many and disparate privacy related statutes). 
 174. See Barbara Crutchfield George et al., U.S. Multinational Employers: Navigating through the “Safe 
Harbor” Principles to Comply with the EU Data Privacy Directive, 38 AM. BUS. L.J. 735, 747 (2001). 
 175. Id.  
Diminishing Sovereignty 
443 
A. Free Speech and Private Information 
An often-reiterated rationale for rejecting national data privacy legislation turns on the 
constitutional protection of free speech.176 A profound belief in the value of information drives 
American reluctance to embrace laws that could constrict discourse, knowledge, and ex-
change of ideas.177 In fact, some contend that relaxing (or even abolishing) data privacy laws 
advances privacy interests because open information empowers individuals to access data 
about themselves and eventually correct false information.178 
While free speech is expressly protected by the U.S. Constitution, there is no explicit con-
stitutional guarantee of a right to privacy. Many provisions in the Bill of Rights, however, in-
clude privacy-related protections. The First Amendment’s protections of association and 
speech, the Third Amendment’s prohibition against conscripting private homes to quarter 
soldiers, the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable searches and seizures, the 
Fifth Amendment’s guard against self-incrimination, and the Fourteenth Amendment’s due 
process and equal protection guarantees all bespeak some aspect of personal privacy.179 
Regardless, those defending the U.S. approach to data privacy contend that government-
mandated restrictions limiting the sharing of personal information, even in the name of “data 
privacy,” violate the First Amendment.180 The United States and the European Union part 
ways in the value each assigns to these two conflicting rights. “One person’s privacy dimin-
ishes another person’s right to know, and vice versa,”181 an oversimplification that neverthe-
less captures much of the discord underscoring the divergent approaches to data privacy. 
Arguments grounded in the First Amendment’s protection of free speech are “ascendant in 
privacy discourse,”182 and “enjoy[] widespread currency in the legal academy, the private sec-
tor, and recent privacy jurisprudence.”183 But they are not unchallenged. Free speech, not in-
frequently, assumes a larger posture in academic and political debate than the courts histori-
cally allow.184 Free speech protection carries greater significance in civil rights contexts, for 
example, than in commercial regulation, a distinction that muddies the water and opens the 
door for attaching greater free speech “rights” than are merited: 
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Such murkiness has allowed what are essentially consumer protection is-
sues in the economic rights context to be transformed into civil rights issues 
of the highest magnitude, as opponents of data privacy regulation have 
seized upon the First Amendment as a handy means of derailing proposals 
to deal with the database problem.185 
While those who decry adoption of a national data privacy law as violative of free speech 
have garnered much support, the question is far from resolved. 
B. Self-Regulation and Private Information 
Another argument made in favor of self-regulation in lieu of a comprehensive data privacy 
law focuses on the role of government. Historical distrust of centralized power, often projected 
onto federal government, distinguishes the United States from the European Union. Privacy 
advocates trumpet national privacy laws as protective of individual civil liberties, but are too 
often non-conversant in American skepticism of powerful central government. “[W]hen it 
comes to privacy, Americans generally do not assume that the government necessarily has 
citizens’ best interests at heart. . . . The European paradigm assumes a much higher comfort 
level with a far more authoritarian government.”186 
EU data subjects hold a legal right to know what information others have gleaned about 
them and to know how such information is used.187 Although such a right is commendable, 
U.S. businesses customarily process personal information without disclosing anything to their 
customers. Grocers track consumer purchases via bar code scanners;188 retailers boost reve-
nue by selling buyer profiles;189 magazines sell customer lists;190 photography studios hawk 
client information;191 and employers restrict workers’ access to their own personnel files.192 
After years of freely processing customer data, requiring businesses to confer notice and ob-
tain consent would seem ludicrous. The market, it is argued, regulates more effectively than 
centralized government.193 Market advocates point to the consonance of relaxed data privacy 
 
 185. Richards, supra note 180, at 1151. See also id. at 1149 (“The First Amendment cri-
tique . . . mistakenly equates privacy regulation with speech regulation. Building on scholarship ex-
amining the boundaries of First Amendment protection, this Article suggests that ‘speech re-
strictions’ in a wide variety of commercial contexts have never triggered heightened First 
Amendment scrutiny, refuting the claim that all information flow regulations fall within the First 
Amendment.”). 
 186. Jane E. Kirtley, The EU Data Protection Directive and the First Amendment: Why a “Press Exemp-
tion” Won’t Work, 80 IOWA L. REV. 639, 648–49 (1995). 
 187. See Data Protection Directive, supra note 58.  
 188. Christine Anthony, Note, Grocery Store Frequent Shopper Club Cards: A Window into Your Home, 4 
B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 7 (1998) (warning the public that grocery store membership cards could ex-
pose sensitive personal information). 
 189. Stan Karas, Enhancing the Privacy Discourse: Consumer Information Gathering as Surveillance, 7 
J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 3 (2002). 
 190. Kramer, supra note 48, at 394–95. 
 191. Dowling, supra note 102, at 8. 
 192. Id. 
 193. P. Amy Monahan, Deconstructing Information Walls: The Impact of the European Data Directive on 
U.S. Businesses, 29 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 275 (1998). See also id. at 288 (stating that the U.S. 
government also traditionally relies upon the ability of industry to regulate itself, viewing a “com-
plex legal or regulatory infrastructure as an undue restriction on the market”). But see Hoofnagle et 
Diminishing Sovereignty 
445 
law with American expectations.194 Americans often dismiss the notion that they should be 
concerned about advertisers’ and retailers’ use of data.195 
One study poignantly demonstrates how incessant information harvesting has become en-
trenched—and therefore expected—among Internet users.196  
The absence of a perceptible threat resulted in individuals’ reluctance to act to protect 
their privacy, contributing to the transformation of privacy from an individual right to a 
public value. As individual users failed to insist on their privacy preferences, the design 
of Internet architecture was left to the privacy preferences of commercial actors.197 
Still, advocates of self-regulation maintain that if consumers demanded stricter privacy pro-
tections, the market would respond.198 
C. Private Data as Property 
From a legal standpoint, individuals have no property right in their own personal infor-
mation.199 U.S. commercial interests balk at recognizing personal information as personal 
property. Granting property rights in an individual’s personal data would arguably promote 
information privacy in cyberspace by empowering individuals to negotiate with businesses 
about the uses to which businesses are allowed to process that data.200 Privacy advocates, un-
successful and dissatisfied with self-regulation, view attachment of property rights to person-
al data as a potential solution.201 “People should own information about themselves, and, as 
owners of property, should be entitled to control what is done with it.”202 
“Despite ‘numerous creative academic proposals for creating property rights in personal 
information, current case law provides that while individuals have no property rights in their 
personal information . . . [,] customer information databases are generally viewed as property 
of the firms that hold them.’ ”203 Much has been written on the benefits and detriments of 
conferring a property right on personal information,204 which is an academic battle unlikely 
to materialize in the near term. 
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D. Big Data 
U.S. businesses, of course, tend to prefer self-regulation, deferring to non-binding industry 
codes, and third-party programs for policing themselves and their respective markets. This 
not only allows business to contain costs by maintaining the status quo, it also fosters the in-
creasingly large data mining205 and data analytics industry.206 Capturing information is easy. 
The difficulty—and potential revenue—comes with the ability to analyze information.207 
The data aggregation industry is big business in the United States,208 with data gathering, 
sorting and selling rapidly becoming the new coin of the kingdom.209 “Data collection is the 
dominant activity of commercial websites. Some 92 percent of them collect personal data from 
web users, which they then aggregate, sort, and use.”210 Data collection—as a source of reve-
nue—was a large industry at the infancy of the EU Directive211 and continues to grow despite 
the Directive’s wide-ranging reach, which highlights the increasing value of consumer infor-
mation as a commercial asset.212 Data analytics was an estimated $25.1 billion industry in 
2004213 and a $105 billion industry in 2010.214 IBM’s 2010 study reveals that eighty-three 
percent of business leaders identify analytics as a top priority for their businesses.215 The rev-
enues of the largest data-mining companies exceed $1 billion annually.216 As one scholar 
 
is property”); Paul M. Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and Personal Data, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2055, 2095 
(2004) (suggesting a five-elemental model for personal information as property). 
 205. Tal Z. Zarsky, Governmental Data Mining and Its Alternatives, 116 PENN ST. L. REV. 285, 291 (2011) 
(“[D]ata mining is defined as the ‘nontrivial process of identifying valid, novel, potentially useful and 
ultimately understandable patterns in data.’ ”). 
 206. Louie Velocci et al., Clarity through Data—The Practicality of Forensic Data Mining for Valuators, 
J. BUS. VALUATION, Feb. 2009, at 21 (“Data analytics is the transformation of data to extract useful 
information and effectively draw conclusions. This can include the use of statistical modeling, selec-
tion of representative subsets of data, curve fitting against an expected outcome, etc. Data mining, 
in contrast, is the application of data modeling, automated computer routines and advanced data 
sampling techniques aimed at the identification of unforeseen patterns within the data. Data min-
ing uses more complex computer modeling, database analysis and theoretical modeling which often 
requires a significant investment in software, computer hardware and specialized data analysis re-
sources.”). 
 207. Tal Z. Zarsky, “Mine Your Own Business!”: Making the Case for the Implications of the Data Mining 
of Personal Information in the Form of Public Opinion, 5 YALE J.L. & TECH. 1 (2003). 
 208. Joel R. Reidenberg, E-Commerce and Trans-Atlantic Policy, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 717, 719–20 (2001); 
Paul Rose, Comment, A Market Response to the European Union Directive on Privacy, 4 UCLA J. 
INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 445, 449 (1999). 
 209. Zarsky, supra note 205 (addressing the use of data mining applications in analyzing personal infor-
mation and its impact upon society). 
 210. See Peppet, supra note 29, at 1164 (noting that corporate data mining links at least seven thousand 
transactions to each individual in the United States per year). 
 211. Joel R. Reidenberg, Restoring Americans’ Privacy in Electronic Commerce, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
771, 775 (1999) (“By 1998, the gross annual revenue of companies selling personal information and 
profiles, largely without the knowledge or consent of the individuals concerned, was reportedly $1.5 
billion.”). 
 212. Andrew J. McClurg, A Thousand Words Are Worth a Picture: A Privacy Tort Response to Consumer 
Data Profiling, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 63, 71–72 (2003). 
 213. Id. at 72. 
 214. IBM Sees Biz Analytics Market Growing Sharply, ECONOMIC TIMES (May 11, 2010), 
http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2010-05-11/news/27589148_1_business-analytics-
information-integration-ibm-software-group.  
 215. Id. 
 216. McClurg, supra note 212, at 71. 
Diminishing Sovereignty 
447 
notes, “there is a lot more money (and therefore political clout) behind those companies that 
want to collect, publish, or use private information.”217 Data processing restrictions, like those 
embodied by the Directive, threaten those companies that rely, even in part, on data collec-
tion and re-use.218 For companies that do not directly rely on information trafficking for reve-
nue, the cost of compliance with Safe Harbor principles is a disincentive.219 
Data mining is not limited to private enterprise. The federal government, among other 
public entities, increasingly employs data mining techniques for law enforcement and other 
governmental purposes.220 “Much of the ‘privacy’ Americans have enjoyed results from the 
fact that it was simply too expensive or laborious to find out intimate data about them. In the 
twenty-first century, technology and law have combined to erode the protection for personal 
privacy previously afforded by practical obscurity.”221 The benefits gained by governmental 
data mining deter it from advocating on behalf of national data privacy regulation. At bottom, 
U.S. business interests recognize material costs if European privacy law, which requires fun-
damental changes in the ease with which marketing data can be garnered, sold, and used, 
replaces the status quo.222 
E. Reluctant Conformity 
Strong arguments, both ideological and economic, anchor the United States to its sectoral 
and self-regulatory approach to data privacy regulation. In light of free speech principles, dis-
trust of centralized government, reliance on market-based solutions, and an increasingly prof-
itable data aggregation industry, the United States stands to lose much by adoption of na-
tional data privacy law.223 But the United States is slowly conforming to the EU approach 
nonetheless. By agreeing to Safe Harbor provisions, has the United States inextricably 
comingled with European privacy law? Said more dramatically: “I am in blood Stepped in so 
far that, should I wade no more, Returning were as tedious as go o’er.”224 
More and more U.S. companies are applying for Safe Harbor. The Department of Com-
merce (DOC) recently announced that approximately fifty companies file initial self-
certifications to the Safe Harbor per month.225 The rate of certification is growing. In a two-
year period, 2008–2010, the number of companies joining Safe Harbor certification grew by 
fifty percent.226 In 2010, there were more than 2100 companies included on the U.S. DOC’s 
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Safe Harbor list. “Placed in context, this means that more companies join Safe Harbor in a 
single month than the total number of companies that have obtained approval for binding 
corporate rules to date . . . .”227 
Enforcement of data privacy laws has become noticeably more active. The Federal Trade 
Commission in December 2012 ordered nine data brokerage companies to reveal how they 
harvest and use data on consumers, toughening the agency’s posture toward the multibillion-
dollar industry.228 “The FTC said it plans to use the information it collects to study the indus-
try’s privacy practices.”229 In June 2012, a California company agreed to pay $800,000 to set-
tle charges that it illegally sold personal information for employment screening.230 In Decem-
ber 2010, the FTC released a proposed framework for businesses and policymakers entitled 
Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change.231 The framework signals the FTC’s 
broadening enforcement scope and increased political will to prosecute data privacy infrac-
tions.232 
Although unsuccessful, several bills have been introduced in Congress that roughly paral-
lel EU data privacy principles. In 1995, Representative Cardiss Collins introduced the Indi-
vidual Privacy Protection Act of 1995, a bill that would amend the Privacy Provisions of Title 
and improve individual privacy protections.233 In just one year, during the term of the 106th 
Congress, legislators submitted twenty-nine major privacy bills affecting personal data and 
the Internet.234 Recently, the Senate Judiciary Committee approved an Act sponsored by 
Senator Al Franken that requires business to obtain consent from customers before collecting 
or sharing mobile location data.235 Debate continues over extensions to the Children's Online 
Privacy Protection Act (COPPA), and the FTC has prodded Congress to pass a law that would 
require data brokers to let people examine their personal files culled from their Internet ac-
tivities.236 
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Breach notification statutes are increasingly popular among state legislatures.237 At least 
forty-five states require companies who lose or otherwise fail to secure sensitive data, such as 
social security and credit card numbers, to inform the affected customers that their personal 
data has been compromised and possibly pay fines.238 The increased data privacy regulations 
in the past two decades,239 coupled with the surge in companies certifying under Safe Harbor 
illustrate the pull of the EU Directive, especially in light of the entrenched arguments that 
militate in favor of self-regulation. 
IV. Privacy Law of Tomorrow 
The EU Directive is largely viewed as the global standard,240 as evidenced by the increas-
ing number of countries that continue to adopt national privacy laws consonant with the Di-
rective’s proscriptions.241 The Directive’s dominance remains somewhat surprising given its 
consistent characterization as the strictest data privacy law currently in force.242 This curiosi-
ty is partly explained by the Internet age and by data’s borderless nature in conjunction with 
the Directive’s prohibition on data transfers without proof of “adequacy”: “either a nation 
demonstrates to the EU that it can ensure adequate levels of privacy protection, or it loses 
access to personal data from the EU.”243 By barring data transfers when the transferee lacks 
the Directive’s protections, the Directive effectively offers the transferee (or data processor) a 
choice: comply with the Directive or risk exclusion from the European market.244 
Less than five years ago, Canada and Malaysia faced this conundrum. Malaysia, like the 
United States, has not historically recognized privacy as a fundamental right. Moreover, the 
Malaysian constitution lists freedom of speech as a fundamental right.245 Instead of creating 
a compendium of privacy rights that were industry specific and otherwise self-regulatory like 
the United States, both Canada and Malaysia enacted national comprehensive data laws that 
mirror the Directive.246 They are not alone. “Non-member countries are vying to meet the Di-
rective’s ‘adequacy’ stipulation in order to transact in information arising from EU citi-
zens.”247 
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Even so, there are meaningful grounds to reject the Directive. Free speech rights, includ-
ing a “right to know,” and a marketplace of ideas unencumbered by artificial controls as well 
as a distrust of ceding Internet censorship to government remain robust rationales cutting 
against the Directive’s universal application.248 Similarly, market-based solutions are argua-
bly more customizable and responsive to consumer demand.249 Finally, an emerging data ag-
gregation and analytic industry not only offers new income in a down economy, it offers ser-
vices previously unknown to business. 
These benefits inherent in a self-regulatory approach are strengthened when considering 
the collateral costs attendant to the Directive’s reach. When Europe dictates to Canada or 
Malaysia, for example, what the data privacy law will be in those countries, a disregard for 
national sovereignty arises that potentially generates political fallout.250 Certainly both 
American and European officials chafe at the compromise embodied by Safe Harbor. Accord-
ing to one commentator, the Directive “smacks of imperialism,”251 evoking questions of 
whether modern colonialism will be clothed in ones and zeros.252 
Homogeneity embodies another potential harm. Universal adherence to the Directive cre-
ates the norm and threatens an array of approaches that have individualized benefits. Differ-
ent cultures value different principles. As exemplified by the tension between privacy and 
free speech, a given nation may value one more than the other. Required compliance with one 
culture’s belief system impoverishes the rest. 
A. Emerging Economies 
While there is certainly a trend favoring the Directive, full international compliance is by 
no means inevitable. In Africa, for example, Internet penetration is lower than in the devel-
oped world, and Africa’s growth rate of Internet users in the last decade has reached 2000%, 
compared to the global average of 480% growth.253 Which way will newly wired nations lean? 
If access to the European market is desired, only one country to date has even made it to the 
negotiation table, and only then agreeing to a diluted form of compliance with the Directive. 
A key for newly data-reliant economies will be bargaining power. Countries seeking access 
to EU e-commerce and outsourcing markets must, as a preliminary condition, demonstrate 
“mutually acceptable harmonized regulations that would be a compromise in stringency.”254 
So far, only one nation with an international trade portfolio comparable to the EU has suc-
cessfully forced a meaningful compromise. The fact that only an economic super power has 
thus far moved Europe off its entrenched position is telling.255 Even the United States, with 
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its substantial economic and political clout, negotiated a bypass of the procedures that merely 
watered down the Directive’s requirements. Recall that the core protections required in the 
Directive are also required for U.S. companies seeking Safe Harbor. The self-certification and 
U.S. enforcement procedures dilute these requirements, but importantly, the requirements 
are nearly identical. This highlights the extent of the Directive’s international influence on 
data transfer practices of entities in countries and economies of all sizes.256 The vital im-
portance of international data transfers enables the European Union to maintain a largely 
uncompromising stance. 
Moreover, what emerging national economy would seek refuge in the U.S. sectoral ap-
proach when the international current runs the other way? As of 2011, seventy-six countries 
have codified national data privacy laws, a consequential number considering that forty years 
ago there were none.257 This international trend accelerated shortly after the EU Directive 
became effective.258 While a sectoral and self-regulatory approach offers significant benefits, 
the sheer number of economically significant countries that have signed on represents a pow-
erful dissuader. “For over two decades the rate of adoption of new privacy laws per year has 
been steadily increasing, and the regions of the globe that have such laws has been steadily 
expanding.”259 Moreover, countries that have promulgated privacy laws that mirror the Di-
rective tend to be larger in size and economic significance, which further incentivizes emerg-
ing countries to join the clear trend.260 
Without such bargaining power, most countries must comply with the strictest standard in 
the data protection system.261 “[T]he cost of failing to actively participate in e-commerce and 
outsourcing with members of the European Union is more likely to drive firms to organize 
and lobby their legislators for a political solution that permits cross-border data transfer, 
than the benefits derived from maintaining the existing data protection regime.”262 Countries 
will conform to the strictest standards because it is more cost efficient to abide by one regula-
tory policy—even a strict one—than multiple and divergent versions.263 
This logic eerily mimics the Directive’s twin purposes: (1) protect private data; (2) facilitate 
free flow of data transfers by requiring a single standard to which all must comply.264 These 
goals are seemingly at odds with each other: If Member States legally restrict information 
traffic in order to protect privacy rights, don’t they thereby restrict the free flow of infor-
mation among Member States? The key to reconciling this apparent conflict is legal uniformi-
ty.265 If the Member States’ data protection laws are uniform, no single Member State can 
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impose differing standards that impede the free flow of information. Binding each Member 
State to a single standard for processing personal information—even a high standard—
promotes privacy protection and facilitates the free flow of information. 
V. Conclusion 
Thomas Friedman’s bestseller, The World is Flat, suggested that globalization changed 
bedrock economic concepts.266 Historical and geographical boundaries have steadily eroded as 
information accessibility, international communication, and workflow software facilitate 
global—rather than national—supply chains. Adaptability and technological intelligence are 
required for businesses and whole economies to survive in the jaws of inevitable globalization. 
Friedman posits that the ubiquity of personal computing coupled with fiber optic cable 
spurred these fundamental shifts in economic function. 
This Article suggests that globalization and “flattening” is not limited to economic princi-
ples but has bled into international policymaking. The borderless nature of data, when gener-
ated or processed on the Internet, is uncoupled from national boundaries and geographical 
borders. Rulemaking has been historically limited to the sovereign or other political body ca-
pable of enforcing the rule, a capability traditionally defined and embodied by nationhood. 
[I]s it open to a State to have resort to its own legal system and, in particu-
lar, its own courts for the purpose of making the conduct of foreigners in 
foreign countries conform to its own commands? . . . 
It would seem that the answers to the above questions must be in the 
negative. Any other result would be repugnant to one’s commonsense and 
the dictates of justice, to that distribution of State jurisdiction and to that 
idea of international forbearance without which the present international 
order cannot continue.267 
The EU Directive ignores that history. It bypasses national sovereignty by prohibiting cer-
tain data transfers—heedless of location—if the transfers fail to comply with the Directive.268 
The Directive was never presented as an international treaty nor negotiated as such, and yet 
it purports to bind entities the world over.269 “Through the EU's ambitious, wide-reaching 
strategy, privacy has become the most prominent area of Internet regulation in which one re-
gion has tried very aggressively to manage spillover effects by exerting substantial market 
pressure outside its borders.”270 The United States consistently resists compliance and not 
without rational justification, but even the world’s foremost economic heavyweight has par-
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tially submitted and faces full submission as more and more countries join, leaving the Unit-
ed States increasingly isolated. 
“Prior to the explosion of Internet use, a medium through which a state has purported to 
extend its jurisdiction throughout the entire world has never existed.”271 Undoubtedly, ongo-
ing and serious questions remain as to whether and how the European Union will enforce the 
Directive as to those entities beyond its legal jurisdiction.272 As one commentator notes, the 
question of extraterritorial enforcement may be irrelevant: 
 Whatever one’s views on this dubious assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction, the 
end result for companies is that it pays to ensure that Internet sites served from outside 
the EU, but could conceivably come within the supervision of EU data protection au-
thorities (e.g., because they collect data from EU residents or otherwise target them), 
comply with at least the general principles of EU data protection law, or at least that 
the company running the site has a strategy in place for dealing with inquiries from EU 
data protection authorities.273 
The United States faces the prospect of coexisting in the global market with nations whose 
data-protection schemes are incompatible with the U.S. theme of self-regulation. The increas-
ing importance of international data transfer in the global economy, when combined with a 
global trend toward comprehensive data protection, highlights the level of success achieved 
by the European Union in bending international will to conform with it privacy Directive. 
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